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GOUTAM U. JOIS*
ABSTRACT
In its most recent term, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Pearson v. Callahan and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, two cases that, even at this early date, can safely be called
“game changers.” What is fairly well known is that Iqbal and Pearson, on their own terms,
will hurt civil rights plaintiffs. A point that has not been explored is how the interaction between Iqbal and Pearson will also hurt civil rights plaintiffs. First, the cases threaten to
catch plaintiffs on the horns of a dilemma. Iqbal says, in effect, that greater detail is required to get allegations past the motion to dismiss stage. But a plaintiff who says too much
at the pleading stage risks getting kicked out by Pearson; if the allegations are very specific,
a court (deciding qualified immunity) will conclude that the constitutional right, if any, is
so specific as not to be clearly established. If the litigant pleads at a level of generality to
avoid the “clearly established” problem, he will get tripped up by Iqbal because the allegations will be deemed “conclusory” or too general to be “plausible.”
Iqbal and Pearson also take divergent tacks with regard to the role of lower courts. In
Pearson, lower courts are entrusted to decide which step of qualified immunity to decide
first. Iqbal also expands courts’ authority by empowering them to determine “plausibility”
based on their “common sense.” But at the same time, Iqbal takes away the district court’s
ability to manage litigation (by using procedures explicitly provided in the Federal Rules
and previously approved by the U.S. Supreme Court) in order to shield public officials, relying instead on the rather blunt instrument of dismissing the case entirely. The cases expand
and restrict lower courts’ discretion, but only do so in a way that makes it easier to dismiss
civil rights lawsuits. Pearson and Iqbal exemplify what I call “procedural judicial activism”: the invention of procedural rules to significantly curtail the availability of remedies in
civil litigation, especially in the context of civil rights claims.
In short, although Pearson and Iqbal are thought of as affecting different, and distinct,
areas of law, they interact in ways that are detrimental to civil rights plaintiffs and, ultimately, all of us. This interaction was not addressed by the Court in either case, nor has it
been recognized in the academic literature thus far.
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I. Introduction
On the first day of Civil Procedure, Professor Arthur Miller tells
his students that they probably will not like the class at first because
it seems alien:
When you come to law school, your prior experience tells you
something about torts, for example. You know what a tort is. You
know what an accident is. . . . You know what contracts are; you’ve
signed contracts and sometimes, maybe you’ve even broken contracts.
But the truth is, nothing in your prior experience prepares you for
civil procedure. . . . [Y]ou don’t know what a motion to dismiss is. You
don’t know what res judicata is. You don’t know what judgment notwithstanding the verdict means. So it’s strange. The concepts are
strange. They don't seem to have any value judgment to them, the
way torts and criminal law are all about value judgments.1

That value-neutrality, of course, is an illusion; “as the year
progresses, you begin to discover that there are value judgments that
lie beneath the surface of each and every aspect of civil procedure.
But it simply takes you a long time to understand that.”2
* * *
Procedural rules never exist in a vacuum. At every stage of litigation, rules dictate who may bring suit, for what reasons, and under
what circumstances. They tell us when the suit must be brought in
which jurisdiction, and they tell us the reasons it can be dismissed.
Procedural rules govern whether your case will be heard by a judge
or a jury, whether it will go to trial or be decided on the papers, and
whether you have the right to an immediate appeal. Procedural rules
tell us who can be sued and who is immune from suit. They tell us
whether immunity is absolute or qualified, and in what circumstances immunity may be overcome.
It is probably obvious that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain (no surprise here) the procedural rules that govern civil litigation.
What might not be obvious is that thousands of pages of judge-made
law dramatically affect who can bring a lawsuit, against whom, in
what substantive areas, when, in which jurisdiction, and for what reason. These judge-made rules, though they have no basis in an authoritative text, get cloaked with the mantle of “neutrality”—precisely because the rules are “strange[; t]he concepts are strange[, and t]hey
don’t seem to have any value judgment to them.”3 Yet these rules
(which, if we are being uncharitable, we might say are simply made up
by judges) are no less binding than those rooted in authoritative texts.
1. Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure: Sum and Substance Audio CD Series (1996).
2. Id.
3. Id.

2010]

PROCEDURAL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

903

In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases that elaborate
upon judge-made doctrines in the procedural areas of qualified immunity and pleading standards. In January, the Court ruled unanimously in Pearson v. Callahan4 that the two-step sequential analysis for qualified immunity, as outlined in Saucier v. Katz,5 was no
longer mandatory. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,6 decided a few months later,
the Court held district courts could dismiss cases if the nonconclusory
allegations in the complaint did not make out an entitlement to relief
that was “plausible” (which the Court helpfully told us, is more than
“possible” but less than “probable”).7 Lower courts are to make this
determination on the basis of “common sense.”8 These cases seem obscure, and they turn on rather dry questions of procedural law. But
just like procedural rules in general, these cases embody very important value judgments. Unless revisited, they will work a disservice to
our nation’s promise of permitting victims of civil rights violations to
achieve redress through civil litigation.
Pearson and Iqbal are problematic for three reasons. First, there
is the obvious: Pearson makes it easier for lower courts to dismiss
lawsuits against government officials, which makes it commensurately harder for a civil rights plaintiff to prevail. Similarly, Iqbal
makes it easier for courts to dismiss lawsuits at the outset, once
again making it harder for plaintiffs to get past a defendant’s motion
to dismiss.
However, there are at least two other, more subtle reasons why
Pearson and Iqbal are problematic. First, the interaction between the
two cases threatens to catch civil rights plaintiffs on the horns of a dilemma. The problem runs something like this: under Pearson, lower
courts are permitted to skip to “step two” of the qualified immunity inquiry; courts may conclude that the officer-defendant is entitled to
immunity, even if a constitutional right was violated, if such right was
not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. This formulation will deter plaintiffs from saying “too much” in their pleadings: if the right is seen as very narrowly described (say, the right to be
free from a hostile racial educational environment caused by studenton-student racial harassment in a public school),9 courts will reason
that, even if such a right existed, it is so specific as not to be “clearly
established.” To avoid this problem, plaintiffs might try pleading at a
level of generality (say, the right to be free from racial discrimination).
4. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
5. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
6. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
7. Id. at 1949 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
8. Id. at 1950.
9. See, e.g., DiStiso v. Town of Wolcott, 539 F. Supp. 2d 562, 567-68 (D. Conn. 2008),
vacated, Disito v.Town of Wolcott, No. 08-1865-CV, 2009 WL 3652096 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2009).
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But this runs the risk of having the complaint dismissed by Iqbal. Allegations pled at a level of generality could be deemed “conclusory” or
not “plausible” and insufficiently specific to put the defendant on notice of the claim against him. Thence arises the dilemma: say too
much, and you’ll lose based on Pearson; say too little, and you’ll lose
based on Iqbal. I illustrate this problem with reference to recent district and appeals court cases, including a case study.
The second problem is that the Pearson-Iqbal interaction simultaneously enlarges and restricts lower courts’ discretion—but does so in
a way that hurts civil rights plaintiffs in either case. Pearson holds
that a court may skip the constitutional violation question and hold
against the plaintiff if the right is not clearly established. In this
way, courts have greater discretion to find a basis for holding the officer immune. Relatedly, Iqbal gives district courts wide latitude to
rely on their “common sense” and conclude that allegations in a complaint are not “plausible.” This increases the chances that a plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed. But at the same time, Iqbal also cuts
back lower courts’ discretion: for decades, it has been assumed that
courts could use various mechanisms to control the process of litigation to shield government officials from undue pretrial burdens. Iqbal
has effectively cut away this discretion, holding instead that in situations where a discretionary shaping of discovery or requiring further
pleading from the plaintiff might have been appropriate,10 the com10. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-601 (1998) (noting that, in
qualified immunity cases, a court has at its disposal mechanisms provided by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 11, 12, and 26, as well as its broad discretion to manage discovery, to ensure that defendants are not unduly burdened). In this Article, I take it as a given
that the Court’s current framework—that qualified immunity must protect the defendant
from “unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings,” id. at 598—must still
inform any development in the doctrine.
I leave aside the antecedent normative question of whether this is a worthwhile goal
at all. I note, however, that even sovereign immunity, perhaps the broadest immunity of
them all, is only an immunity against money damages and not a wholesale immunity from
the “burdens” of litigation. And the idea that the possibility of liability would be “peculiarly
disruptive of effective government,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982), seems
to have been more armchair philosophizing than an empirical conclusion. The only citation
Harlow provided was to a concurring opinion by Judge Gerhard A. Gessell of the D.C. District Court, from when he was sitting by designation on the D.C. Circuit. See id. at 817 n.29
(citing Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (1979) (Gessell, J., concurring), aff’d in
pertinent part by an equally divided Court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981)). And Judge Gessell’s opinion contains no citation whatsoever. At bottom, it is simply a call to raise the bar on civil
rights plaintiffs: “In short, I urge a more exacting standard be placed on the showing a
plaintiff must make before proceeding to trial in the face of a properly presented qualified
immunity claim.” Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d at 1215 (Gessell, J., concurring). If the
rationale behind the current qualified immunity doctrine is simply one district judge’s belief, thirty years ago, that “a more exacting standard [should] be placed on” civil rights
plaintiffs, id., perhaps it is time to revisit the rationale.
Some might argue that it was an “activist” decision that revivified § 1983 claims in
the first place and that this activism required subsequent judicial action to properly define
the boundaries of such claims. This may be true in the context of Bivens claims against
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plaint should instead be dismissed. In sum, whether by expanding or
restricting district courts’ discretion, the Supreme Court has narrowed the universe of civil rights complaints that will proceed to the
merits and ultimately succeed.
Recent years have brought much talk of “judicial activism.” Political commentators, generally on the right, have successfully framed
activism as the province of liberals—those who disregard the meaning of the Constitution and tradition to limit capital punishment,
grant “special status” to homosexuals, prohibit display of the Ten
Commandments at school, and so on.11 But one thing that Iqbal and
Pearson make clear is that “activism,” at least as that term is popularly conceived, is not solely the province of liberals. Iqbal presented
a departure from over seventy years’ understanding of the meaning
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and arguably conflicts with
the plain language of the Federal Rules and long-standing case law.
Pearson deviates from two decades of precedent and is part of a line
of cases shielding government officials from liability, a notion that
appears nowhere in the Constitution and that has never been described in congressional statutes.12 Shrinking access to civil rights
federal officers. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). But it is
clear that the plain language § 1983 contemplates personal liability:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is clear that § 1983: (1) contemplates personal liability; (2) provides a certain
limitation on liability with regard to judicial officers; and (3) contains no other similar limitation or immunity. Judicially created immunity doctrines might have some purchase in
the Bivens context, but they are less persuasive in the § 1983 context. Nonetheless, the two
have typically been treated identically. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978).
Butz is still good law. See Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1022 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the same two-step qualified immunity analysis in connection with §
1983 claims and Bivens claims).
11. See, e.g., Judicial Activism: the Biggest 2002 Election Issue, 36 THE PHYLLIS
SCHLAFLY REPORT (Oct. 2002), http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2002/oct02/psroct02.shtml.
12. The phrase “qualified immunity” appears twice in the United States Code. Of
these, only one even indirectly addresses the qualified immunity doctrine as explicated by
the Supreme Court. First, 6 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006) provides, in essence, that an individual
who voluntarily reports suspected terrorist activity will not be liable for making such report unless he made the report knowing it to be false or with a reckless disregard from the
truth. The statute goes on to specify that government officials who respond to such reports
“shall have qualified immunity from civil liability for such action, consistent with applicable law in the relevant jurisdiction.” Id. § 1104(b)(1). However, the legislative history
makes clear that the law was not intended “to amend, limit, or reduce existing qualified
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remedies is no less “activist” merely because it happens under the
guise of ostensibly neutral procedural rules.
Iqbal is typically thought of as a case about pleading standards,13
and Pearson is typically thought of as a case about qualified immunity.14 Although these formulations are correct, my goal in this Article
is to highlight the intersection of, and interaction between, these two
cases. In so doing, I will demonstrate that Iqbal and Pearson are not
only harmful to civil rights plaintiffs separately but also when taken
together.15 This Article is the first (in print or online) to explain this
dilemma, awareness of which is of the utmost importance to attorneys litigating civil rights claims against government defendants.
These insights are important from an academic perspective as
well. The law of qualified immunity has been a muddle—and now, so
is the law regarding pleading standards. Courts are inconsistent,
both between circuits and among different panels of the same circuit,

immunity or other defenses pursuant to Federal, State, or local law that may otherwise be
available to authorized officials as defined by this section.” CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R.
1, IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007, 153 Cong.
Rec. H8496-01, H8583 (Jul. 25, 2007). Thus, although § 1104 recognizes the defense of
qualified immunity, it does not define it in the statute, or even explicitly state that the doctrine should be applied as explicated by the courts. If Congress wanted to adopt the federal
common law of qualified immunity, it could have done so explicitly. In several other contexts, Congress specifically leaves rules up to common law decisionmaking. See, e.g., 12
U.S.C.A. § 2279aa-14(2) (“All civil actions to which the [Federal Agricultural Mortgage]
Corporation is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States and, to
the extent applicable, shall be deemed to be governed by Federal common law.”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(a) (providing that, in instances where the district courts do not have the power to
fully vindicate civil rights claims, “the common law [subject to certain limitations] shall be
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause . . . .”); FED.
R. EVID. 501 (“Except as otherwise required . . . , the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.”).
The phrase also appears in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006), which references
the limitation on personal liability of government officials in a particular context. However,
this statutory immunity, though described as “qualified immunity,” does not use the term
in the sense that it is employed by the Supreme Court.
13. See, e.g., Posting of Howard Wasserman to PrawfsBlawg, Iqbal and the Death of
Notice Pleading: Part I, at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/iqbal-andthe-death-of-notice-pleading-part-i.html (May 18, 2009).
14. See, e.g., Jack Ryan, United States Supreme Court Changes Qualified Immunity
Rules for Civil Rights Lawsuits Brought Against Law Enforcement Officers, PUBLIC
AGENCY TRAINING COUNCIL, January 21, 2009, http://www.patc.com/weeklyarticles/
qualified_immunity_pearson_v_callahan.shtml.
15. It is true that Iqbal applies to all civil actions, not just civil rights claims. But Iqbal itself noted that the concerns that motivated moving to a higher, plausibility standard
in civil litigation were especially acute in the civil rights context. See 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
Indeed, Judge Posner believes that Iqbal may even be limited to that context. See infra,
note 19 and accompanying text. Thus, whatever the scope of Iqbal, it is clear that it has its
greatest force in the civil rights context.
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as to the precise test for qualified immunity.16 The lower courts cited
Iqbal more than 500 times in the two months after the decision was
handed down,17 but there is disagreement as to the meaning of the
new case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg believes the Iqbal “ ‘majority
messed up the federal rules’ governing civil litigation.”18 Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit, however, believes Iqbal is
“special in its own way” and perhaps limited to the context of civil
rights claims against high government officials or in complex cases.19
The same divide—between those who think Iqbal is far-reaching and
those who believe it is limited in application—exists in the commentary about the case.20
Thus, in addition to explaining the problem posed by the PearsonIqbal interaction, this Article will contribute to the still-evolving discourse on the precise contours and meaning of these areas of law.
II. PEARSON AND IQBAL
In this Part, I provide a brief overview of the relevant aspects of
Pearson and Iqbal. In these sections, I will also discuss the development of the law of qualified immunity and pleading standards, respectively. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather,
my goal is to provide sufficient background to illuminate the discussion in this Part and the thesis I advance in Part III.
A. Pearson v. Callahan
In Saucier v. Katz,21 the Supreme Court directed lower courts to
conduct a two-step, ordinal inquiry with regard to qualified immunity. First, courts were to determine whether the facts pled, shown,

16. Compare Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 n.8 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To rule on the
issue of qualified immunity, this Court generally proceeds in two steps.”) with Harhay v.
Town of Ellington Bd. of Educ., 323 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Our analysis of a qualified
immunity claim consists of a three step inquiry.”). This inconsistency—two steps versus three
steps—is or has been present in cases in at least the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits. I address this problem in a forthcoming article, “An Additional Hurdle”: How the Circuit Courts Messed Up Qualified Immunity (on file with author).
17. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html?_r=1.
18. Id.
19. See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009).
20. Compare Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (“The headline need no longer equivocate. . . . [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Iqbal] have destabilized the entire system of civil
litigation.”) with Maxwell S. Kennerly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Not Nearly As Important As You Think,
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2009/06/articles/the-law/for-lawyers/ashcroft-v-iqbal-notnearly-as-important-as-you-think/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010) (suggesting that Iqbal should be
limited to Bivens claims against high-ranking government officials).
21. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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or found (depending on the stage of litigation) made out a constitutional violation.
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to
set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding that a
right is clearly established. This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon
turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as
the first inquiry.22

If, and only if, a court answers this question in the affirmative, it is
to proceed to the second step of the analysis: “if a violation could be
made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next,
sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.”23
Fully understanding how we got to Saucier, however, requires a bit of
background on the nature of qualified immunity in general.
When a state official’s conduct causes the deprivation of an individual’s constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables the victim to
bring a damages claim against the official in the officer’s personal capacity, i.e., in a suit against the official himself, not the state government or agency. Although § 1983 had formally been on the books
since 1871, its potential was not fully exploited until after the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape.24 Ten years later, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, held
that individuals have an analogous cause of action against federal
government officials.25 In circumstances where constitutional rights
have been violated, damages claims are one of the primary vehicles
for the individual’s enforcement of his or her civil rights as enumerated in the Constitution.26
Very shortly after Bivens, the Supreme Court began cutting back
the scope of this remedy. The Court became concerned about the risk
of unsubstantiated legal claims against government actors, which, it
has claimed, pose a threat to the operation of government by deterring the zealousness and enthusiasm with which public officials
might execute their office and by deterring able citizens away from
public service out of an aversion to the expenses of litigation.27 The
Supreme Court has recognized a policy interest in allowing govern22. Id. at 201 (2001).
23. Id.
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding actions are taken “under color” of state law when the
“wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of the state” as opposed to actions taken by officials pursuant to state law) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 325, 326 (1941)).
25. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) superseded by statute on other
grounds, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat 5089, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-81 (2004).
27. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975).
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ment officials facing frivolous or meritless lawsuits to enjoy immunity from “the costs of trial or . . . the burdens of broad-reaching discovery,” which would divert their energy away from the fulfillment of
their official responsibilities.28
Qualified immunity, the Court tells us, is “the best attainable accommodation of competing values.”29 This affirmative defense is designed to achieve the dual aims of permitting the prosecution of civil
rights torts while ensuring that “[i]nsubstantial lawsuits can be
quickly terminated by federal courts . . . .”30 The Court has determined that where “clearly established rights are not implicated, the
public interest may be better served by action taken ‘with independence and without fear of consequences.’ ”31 Therefore, the defendant
in a § 1983 action may, prior to discovery, move that the trial court
dismiss the claim, contingent on a showing that the conduct alleged
by the plaintiff does not appear to have violated the plaintiff’s clearly
established constitutional rights. In particular, qualified immunity is
granted when the facts alleged show that the officer was acting reasonably “as measured by reference to clearly established law.”32 Government officials are granted immunity from suit “as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights
they are alleged to have violated”;33 and this protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”34
The important thing to note here is that the qualified immunity
doctrine is not just an immunity from having to pay money damages
(as is state sovereign immunity, for example) but an immunity from
having to endure any litigation at all in the first instance.
Though § 1983 does not enumerate any immunities from litigation, the Court in Wood v. Strickland held Congress could not have
intended to abolish the traditional common law immunities for legislators, judges, police and administrators.35 Wood framed the test as a
subjective one: the officer would not be liable if he acted in “good
faith” and with the absence of malice.36 Thus, the officer would be liable if he should have known he was violating a right or was acting
maliciously.37 Wood’s subjective test was soon replaced. But its core
28. Harlo w v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
29. Id. at 814.
30. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
31. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
32. Id. at 818.
33. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
34. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
35. 420 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1975) (“Common-law tradition, recognized in our prior decisions, and strong public-policy reasons also lead to a construction of § 1983 extending a
qualified good-faith immunity . . . .”).
36. Id. at 322.
37. See id.
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motivation—the policy that officials should be protected from suit,
even though no such immunity appears in § 1983—lives on.
Seven years later, Harlow v. Fitzgerald replaced the subjective
test (whether the officer knew he was violating rights) with an objective one (whether a reasonable officer could have known that the actions violated rights).38 Again, the Court was concerned with the policy goal of terminating civil rights litigation as quickly as possible:
some courts had held the officer’s state of mind (under the Wood
standard) was a matter of fact and could not be decided on summary
judgment, whereas the objective standard could be.39
The basic formulation in Harlow persists: government officials
will be immune when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known . . . [o]n summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but
whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.”40 This is a test of the state of the relevant law, not the officer’s state of mind.41 The Court elaborated on the relevant standard in
Anderson v. Creighton, holding that to be clearly established, “[t]he
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”42
The exact conduct alleged need not previously have been held unlawful, but in the light of pre-existing law its unlawfulness must be “apparent.”43 Anderson emphasized the question was not merely whether
the right had been clearly established in some general sense, but
whether on these facts the right was established.44
The Court began to distill the Harlow standard into a more workable analytic framework a few years later. Frederick Siegert had filed
a Bivens claim against his former employer, a federal hospital administrator, who had released an unfavorable employment evaluation to
his current employer, with allegedly “bad faith motivation,” which re-

38. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
39. See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“On the subjective criterion [of the Wood test] which ‘turns on officials’ knowledge and good faith belief’
summary action may be more difficult. Questions of intent and subjective attitude frequently cannot be resolved without direct testimony of those involved.”); see also Wood, 420
U.S. 308; FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
40. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 556 (1978)
and Wood, 420 U.S. at 322).
41. Id.
42. 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
43. Id.
44. See id. This period also included an important case regarding the procedure of
qualified immunity. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Court underscored the
fact that qualified immunity is an immunity from litigation itself, and held that interlocutory appeals could be taken from a denial of qualified immunity.
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sulted in his termination.45 The District Court had held the officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff had
made sufficient allegations of malice. However, the Supreme Court
disagreed. The first, threshold inquiry, the Court said, had to be
whether Siegert had, on the facts alleged, made out a constitutional
violation at all. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the task of
identifying the particular right which is alleged to have been violated
had to be undertaken at an “analytically earlier stage of the inquiry”
when handling a qualified immunity claim.46 The Court said it was
incorrect to “examine the sufficiency of the allegations of malice”
without first resolving the “threshold immunity question” of whether
or not, in claiming malicious defamation by a federal employer, a
constitutional rights violation had even been alleged.47 Chief Justice
Rehnquist again focused on the motivating policy concern behind this
line of cases, reasoning that the merits-first sequence would “permit[]
courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test” when the
allegations did not make out a constitutional violation.48 The Court
applied this two-step sequence, found that Siegert’s claim failed at
the first step, and ruled in favor of the defendants.49
Siegert was the first case to explain qualified immunity in terms of
a sequential analysis. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a claim
that had not even made out a constitutional violation should get
kicked out, regardless of the officer’s malice (or lack thereof) in his
treatment of the plaintiff.50 However, this sequencing was not explicitly made mandatory.51 Seven years later, in County of Sacramento
v. Lewis,52 Justice Souter described sequencing as the “better approach.”53 He explained that sequencing was necessary to guard
against constitutional stagnation:
What is more significant is that if the policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified immunity whenever
there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of primary conduct,
standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to
the detriment both of officials and individuals. An immunity de45. Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F. 2d 797, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
46. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 227 (1991).
47. Id. at 232.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 233-34.
50. Id.
51. Paul Hughes points out that many circuits did make the two-step approach mandatory, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had not required it at the time. See Paul
W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of
Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 410 (2009) (“Many courts adopted such an
analysis[,] holding sequencing as mandatory, including panels in the First, Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.”) (citations omitted).
52. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
53. Id. at 841 n.5.
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termination, with nothing more, provides no clear standard, constitutional or nonconstitutional. In practical terms, escape from
uncertainty would require the issue to arise in a suit to enjoin future conduct, in an action against a municipality, or in litigating a
suppression motion in a criminal proceeding; in none of these instances would qualified immunity be available to block a determination of law. But these avenues would not necessarily be open,
and therefore the better approach is to determine the right before
determining whether it was previously established with clarity.54

The judiciary, however, was not vigilant about observing the two-step
sequence. In Conn v. Gabbert,55 the Court made the two-step sequence mandatory: “a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at
all,” only then can a court “proceed to determine whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”56 Just as
in Siegert, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that an officer is denied
immunity if “the official [is] shown to have violated ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known,’ ” and that the determination as to the actual
presence or not of an alleged constitutional rights violation is logically prior to any considerations as to the degree to which such a right is
established in the law.57 A similar problem arose in Wilson v. Layne.58
There, the Fourth Circuit granted the defendant-officers immunity
but “declined to decide whether the actions of the police violated the
Fourth Amendment.”59 The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that
determining the constitutional question first “promotes clarity in the
legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers
and the general public.”60
Two terms later, Saucier v. Katz 61 firmly established the two-step
sequence. The Court wrote:
A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must
consider . . . this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show
the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be
the initial inquiry. . . . If no constitutional right would have been
violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for
further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other
54. Id. (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
55. 526 U.S. 286 (1999).
56. Id. at 290.
57. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 290.
58. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
59. Id. at 608.
60. Id. at 609. The Court held police officers bringing media representatives along
during the execution of an arrest warrant violated the Fourth Amendment but found qualified immunity on the ground that the law was not clearly established. Id. at 605-06.
61. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the
parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether
the right was clearly established.62

Like Chief Justice Rehnquist in Wilson and Justice Souter in Lewis,
Justice Kennedy in Saucier was concerned about the elaboration of
constitutional rights. Sequencing, he wrote, is important to ensure
“the law’s elaboration from case to case.”63 The role of the courts was
to explain the scope and nature of constitutional rights; “[t]he law
might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip
ahead to the question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.”64
To recap: the Court in the 1960s and 70s held § 1983 and Bivens
actions could be used to vindicate constitutional rights. But the scope
of liability was almost immediately curtailed: substantively by Wood
and Harlow (which established the defense of qualified immunity)
and procedurally by Mitchell (which permitted interlocutory appeals).
As to the substantive analysis, the Court was insistent that the constitutional question be decided first: to weed out insubstantial claims,
to put defendant-officers on notice of the law, and to ensure that the
constitutional law did not stagnate. The failure of lower courts to follow this process post-Siegert was what forced the Court to press, with
increasing insistence, the mandatory two-step sequence.
That all changed in January 2009 with Pearson v. Callahan.65
That case concerned a warrantless search and application of the
Fourth Amendment’s “consent-once-removed” doctrine.66 If you don’t
know what this doctrine is, don’t worry: the Court bypassed this issue entirely. Sua sponte, it ordered briefing as to whether Saucier’s
mandatory two-step should be overruled.67 A few months later, the
Court unanimously overruled Saucier.68
It is important, however, to note what the Court did not do. Many
critiques of Saucier had argued that the mandatory merits-first sequence was unconstitutional or otherwise legally infirm.69 But the
Court did not overrule Saucier on constitutional grounds, or really
anything that might be described as “legal reasoning.” In fact, it left
the two steps of the Saucier analysis entirely undisturbed. Instead,

62. Id. at 201.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
66. Id.
67. Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702, 1702-03 (2008) (order granting certiorari).
68. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808.
69. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275–81 (2006); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 920 (2005).
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the Court found that the mandatory process was inefficient.70 Saucier
was thus overruled on entirely prudential grounds:
On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude
that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it
should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light
of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.71

In the very next paragraph, the Court again reiterated that Saucier
sequencing is “often beneficial.”72 But the mandatory two-step was
no more.
Of course, the Court was then left with the task of justifying its
departure from Saucier, Anderson, Siegert, Gabbert and Harlow. Justice Alito wrote there was no stare decisis problem because those considerations applied primarily to contract or property cases, not those
involving judge-made rules.73 And the Court focused on the practical
effects: lower courts found the mandatory sequencing problematic,
and that weighed in favor of abandoning the standard.74
What about constitutional elaboration? With a little hand waving,
that problem was made to go away, too:
Most of the constitutional issues that are presented in § 1983 damages actions and Bivens cases also arise in cases in which that defense is
not available, such as criminal cases and § 1983 cases against a municipality, as well as § 1983 cases against individuals where injunctive
relief is sought instead of or in addition to damages.75

Moreover, the Court asserted that decisions on constitutional questions may in some cases “have scant value,” for example, when the issue is pending in a higher court, or hinges on the interpretation of an
ambiguous state statute.76 The Court recognized the protocol often
contributes to the goal of efficiently weeding out unsubstantial claims
when a complaint can be targeted as not making out a constitutional
violation but held the lower courts are better able to determine those
cases in which this benefit is available.77
The obvious reply, of course, is that courts had come up with ready
solutions to these “problems.” For example, a federal court faced with a
question of state law could certify the state law issue to the state’s
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818-19.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 821.
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highest court, retain jurisdiction, and decide the immunity issue accordingly.78 Indeed, Pearson’s citation for the proposition that constitutional rights may be elaborated through other avenues was Lewis. But
Lewis itself had reasoned that “these avenues would not necessarily be
open, and therefore the better approach is to determine the right before
determining whether it was previously established with clarity.”79 It is
curious that the argument in favor of the “better approach” is used, a
decade letter, to justify abandoning that same approach.
And so this is the legacy of Pearson: throughout the 1990s, even after Siegert, courts were not adhering to the strongly suggested twostep analysis. The Ninth Circuit had even developed its own two-step
procedure that bypassed Siegert’s first step entirely.80 From 1999 to
2001, from Wilson to Saucier, the Court tightened the screws and
made the two-step mandatory. And then, about a decade later, just as
the lower courts finally came into line, the Court abandoned its efforts.
B. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Before discussing Iqbal, some background is in order. In 2007, the
United States Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,81 a telecommunications antitrust case. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had engaged in an illegal, anticompetitive conspiracy; the defendants countered by arguing that their actions, while parallel, were independent. Although the complaint contained detailed allegations regarding the actions taken by each company, the allegations regarding the existence of a conspiracy were
much thinner.82
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, found the complaint lacking.
Pleading the existence of the conspiracy merely upon information
and belief, or in conclusory terms, was held insufficient. For example,
he noted, parallel conduct was also consistent with the companies
acting in their own profit-maximizing self interest in the marketplace. Although the competitors’ conduct was “consistent” with a conspiracy, it was not “plausible” that a conspiracy had taken place;83
the plaintiffs “mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in

78. The Sixth Circuit followed a similar procedure in Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d
539 (6th Cir. 2009). The court concluded that any right was not clearly established and (because it was post-Pearson) held that the defendants were entitled to immunity. Id. at 550.
However, in order to determine the claims against the municipal defendant, it certified the
question of whether a property interest existed to the Michigan Supreme Court. Id. at 551.
79. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (emphasis added).
80. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199-201 (2001).
81. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
82. See generally id. at 550-52.
83. See id. at 564-65.
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the alleged conspiracies.”84 Therefore, they “ha[d] not nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”85
Twombly sent shock waves through the civil procedure field. Although it was an antitrust case, it was not clear its holding was so
limited: the Supreme Court was interpreting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2),86 and the Rules apply equally to all civil actions.87
The destabilizing effect of Twombly was due in part to the fact that
the current pleading regime had been in place for at least fifty years
(since 1957, when the Supreme Court decided Conley v. Gibson88) and
probably more like seventy (since 1938, when the Rules were
adopted). In Conley, the Court instructed that a complaint was not to
be dismissed unless there was “no set of facts” that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief.89 And since 1938, Rule 8(a)(2) required only “a short
and plain statement of the claim” showing an entitlement to relief,90
Twombly, for the first time, invited a federal judge to decide how likely it was that the allegations in the complaint were true. Only if they
were “plausible” was the case to go forward.
Justice Stevens dissented in Twombly. In so doing, he noted,
“[w]hether the Court’s actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a
complaint will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the future will answer.”91
Iqbal provided that answer. Javaid Iqbal was a Pakistani Muslim
who was detained by the federal government after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks. Iqbal claimed he was subjected to harsh interrogation and abuse because of his race. Iqbal therefore sued the
“street-level” officials who were responsible for his alleged abuse. But
he did not stop there. Iqbal also claimed that John D. Ashcroft, the
United States Attorney General on September 11, 2001, and Robert
Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the
time, directed and implemented a conspiracy to deprive him of his
rights because of his race.92 Serious allegations, maybe even true al-

84. Id. at 565 n.10.
85. Id. at 570.
86. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55.
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the notion of heightened pleading standards in particular contexts. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S.
506, 512-513 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
88. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
89. 355 U.S. at 45-46.
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
91. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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legations, but—in the view of the Supreme Court’s 5-4 majority—not
plausible allegations.93
The Supreme Court followed a two-step process in dismissing Iqbal’s claims against Ashcroft and Mueller. First, it disregarded the
allegations that were deemed “conclusory.”94 Then, it determined that
the remaining (nonconclusory) allegations, standing alone, were insufficient to form an entitlement to relief:
On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were
likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and
who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist
acts. As between that “obvious alternative explanation” for the arrests, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent
asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.95

Thus, Iqbal’s claim—and all others—were to be judged by the new
standard, which the Court explained as follows:
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by [1]
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. [2] When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.96

This is the two-step framework by which courts are to judge complaints at the motion to dismiss; first, disregard all conclusory allegations; second, determine whether the remaining allegations make out
a “plausible” entitlement to relief.
That, at least, is how most people have taken Iqbal.97 It is also the
conception I work with in this Article. But before going forward, I want
to pause to highlight two aspects of the Supreme Court’s formulation
that render it problematic even on its own terms (i.e., apart from the
problems I highlight in this Article as regarding civil rights plaintiffs).
First, Iqbal does not say that lower courts must use this formulation.
Rather, it says that a court “can choose to” apply the two-step approach.98 Although courts seem to have taken Iqbal to be mandatory, ra-

93. Id. at 1952.
94. Id. at 1951.
95. Id. at 1951-52 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)
(emphasis added and citation omitted).
96. Id. at 1950.
97. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L REV. 1293,
1316 (2010).
98. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
567 (2007) (emphasis added)).
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ther than discretionary,99 this somewhat curious phrase is worth noting.
Iqbal, unlike Pearson, does not explicitly give courts the choice between
different frameworks for analyzing the legal question.
Second, Iqbal says that conclusory allegations are not entitled to
the presumption of truth. But in so doing, the Court conflates two
types of “conclusions.” The relevant passage in Iqbal reads,
[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. (Although for the
purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation . . . .”).100

But this paragraph is sloppy. It equates “conclusory statements” with
“legal conclusion[s],” even though these terms are used to mean two
different things.
Take this example: “X was negligent” is an allegation not entitled
to the presumption of truth because the allegation is pleading nothing more than a legal conclusion (negligence). However, the allegation, “X was walking down Fifth Avenue” is an allegation that is entitled to the presumption of truth—even though it is “conclusory.”101
The allegation provides no facts that would establish that X actually
was walking down the street. It “mention[s] no specific time, place, or
person involved in the alleged” walking down the street.102 Yet this
statement is entitled to the presumption of truth. The distinction is
not that one is “conclusory” while the other is not. The distinction is
that one is a legal conclusion while the other is a factual conclusion.
Iqbal conflates the two, and in so doing, opens a can of worms. Justice Souter suggested in his Iqbal dissent that the only factual conclusions disentitled to the presumption of truth are those “that are
sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little
green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in
time travel.”103 But the majority did not limit the plausibility standard in this way. Instead, a court is to rely on its “judicial experience

99. See, e.g., Torn Ranch, Inc. v. Sunrise Commodities, Inc., No. C 09-02674, 2009 WL
2834787, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009) (“A court must ‘begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ ”)
(quoting Iqbal) (emphasis added); Mohammad v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., No.
08-CV-4943, 2009 WL 1514635, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) (“I must begin by ‘identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ ”) (quoting Iqbal) (emphasis added).
100. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
101. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “conclusory” as “[e]xpressing a factual inference
without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 308 (8th ed. 2004).
102. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007).
103. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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and common sense” in determining whether a claim is plausible, after disregarding “conclusory” allegations.104
To be sure, Iqbal attempts to frame the discussion as one of legal,
not factual, conclusions.105 But the Court went on to disregard various allegations because they were factually conclusory, writing, “[i]t
is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, rather than their
extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”106 Of course, a legal conclusion, standing alone, is neither fanciful nor plausible; it simply is. What would make a claim
fanciful are the facts supporting that legal conclusion. “The doctor
negligently harmed me by operating on me while drunk” is not fanciful; “the doctor negligently harmed me by operating on me after his
brain had been removed from his skull by aliens who were using him
in an inter-galactic biological study” is fanciful. The difference has
nothing to do with the legal conclusion (negligence in both cases) and
turns entirely on the facts. By directing courts to disregard “conclusory” factual allegations (as opposed to legal statements), the Court
does grave violence to the long-standing proposition that a plaintiff’s
factual allegations are entitled to be taken as true.
The passage also conflates what are ostensibly the two prongs of
the Iqbal analysis. Recall that a court is first to disregard conclusory
allegations, and second, determine whether the remaining allegations entitle the pleader to relief. Yet the decision as to whether an
allegation is conclusory cannot be made in a vacuum. It is necessarily
affected by the cause of action pled, the type of relief sought, and the
court’s ability (or lack thereof) to award such relief, among other
things. An allegation along the lines of “X singled me out because of
my race” apparently does not pass muster under Iqbal.107 This seems
to be because the allegation embodies a “legal conclusion,” “because
of my race.” But Iqbal also disregarded allegations that Ashcroft was
the “principal architect” of an illegal policy.108 This statement embodies no legal conclusion and is simply a fact that either is or is not
true. Once again, the Court blurs the line between legal allegations
and factual allegations, improperly disregarding the latter.
Finally, the discussion indicates how the Court is elevating form
over substance. Though “X singled me out because of my race” does
not pass muster, “X singled me out; I am an Arab Muslim; non-Arab,
non-Muslims were not singled out” probably would. This is so, ostensibly, because the allegations do not contain a legal conclusion (“because of my race”), even though the new allegations could be based on
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1950 (Opinion of the Court).
See id.
Id. at 1951 (emphasis added).
Cf. id. at 1950-51.
Id. at 1951.
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identical facts and, as a substantive matter, add nothing. A court can
only conclude that the first formulation is “conclusory” by (1) making
reference to something beyond the allegations themselves, suggesting
that the factual allegation/legal conclusion dichotomy further breaks
down, or (2) elevating form over substance. Both are bad options.
In just a few short months, Iqbal has spawned a substantial corpus of commentary. Commentators have argued the Court made important policy judgments in Twombly and Iqbal that it should not
have made109 or that Iqbal is part of the desirable evolution of federal
pleading standards.110 Though the standard view appears to be that
Iqbal raised the bar on plaintiffs,111 others have argued that Iqbal
can be fully reconciled with pre-Towmbly precedent.112 There are also
questions as to whether the sample forms contained in the Federal
Rules are valid anymore, since the statements in those forms might
be deemed “conclusory.”113 My intention is not to explain or even fully
engage these critiques, which I note merely for the sake of completeness. Instead, I provide a doctrinally and conceptually distinct criticism of Iqbal: that the interaction between Iqbal and Pearson works
to the detriment of civil rights plaintiffs. This is the project of the
next part.
III. HOW THE CASES HURT CIVIL RIGHTS PLAINTIFFS
Having described the two cases that are the focus of this Article, I
now describe the ways in which they harm civil rights plaintiffs.114 First,
there is the obvious way: Pearson makes it easier to grant government
109. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 20, at 831-32.
110. Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, at
http://ssrn.com/papers=1463844, at 4-5 (Iqbal “presents a welcome evolution of pleading
standards that is likely to have beneficial effects in terms of the efficiency of civil litigation”).
111. See, e.g., Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009)
(noting Iqbal “raised the bar for pleading requirements”); Smith, supra note 110, at 2 (“Iqbal thus represents a further raising of the bar plaintiffs must meet before they are allowed to proceed with discovery”); Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to
Dismiss, 35 No. 3 LITIG. 1, 2 (2009) (“Iqbal drastically changed the landscape for Rule
12(b)(6) motions”).
112. See Steinman, supra note 97, at 1299-1300 (arguing that defining conclusory in
“transactional terms” could reconcile Iqbal with pre-Twombly precedent).
113. Federal Civil Form 11, for example, which ostensibly would be sufficient in a negligence action, reads simply, “On [date], at [place], the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or
income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of $[amount].”
Allen Ides has suggested that Form 11 may not pass muster under the new standard. See
Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243
F.R.D. 604, 633 (2008).
114. Iqbal, of course, is not limited to civil rights cases. However, it arose in that context and will probably have its greatest effect in that field. Even those who argue that Iqbal is of limited effect, see Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 20, acknowledge that it must, at
a minimum, apply to these cases.

2010]

PROCEDURAL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

921

officials immunity and, by permitting courts to skip “step one,” inhibits
development of constitutional law. Iqbal, by raising the bar for pleading,
makes it harder for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss.
But my focus in this Article is not only the shortcomings of the
cases on their own terms but also on the deleterious effects of the interaction of the two cases. The cases interact in three ways that are
harmful to civil rights plaintiffs.
First, there is this dilemma: a plaintiff who describes the constitutional right in question in great detail runs the risk of losing on
Saucier step two, when a court holds that his right is not clearly established. If the plaintiff tries to avoid this possibility by pleading at
a level of generality, he or she risks losing on Iqbal—either because
the allegations are deemed “conclusory” or because they are taken to
be “implausible.”
Second, the Court gives short shrift to the fact that the first step
of qualified immunity—whether there are allegations or facts that
could make out a constitutional violation—is the same as the test for
whether a plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim. In other words, Iqbal not only raises the bar for pleading but also raises the bar for
Saucier step one.
Third, the cases take divergent tracks with regard to lower courts’
discretion. They expand discretion in some regards (in determining
which step of qualified immunity to address first (Pearson) and in determining which allegations are “conclusory” or “implausible” (Iqbal)). However, discretion is also cut back: the Court in Iqbal explicitly rejected the notion of using litigation management to shield government officials, directing courts instead to dismiss cases outright.
The combined effect is that discretion is expanded in some regards,
limited in others, but always in a way that makes it easier to dismiss
civil rights lawsuits.
A. The Obvious
As others have noted, there are some fairly obvious ways in which
Pearson and Iqbal hurt civil rights plaintiffs. First, Pearson, as described above, permits courts to skip to the second step of the qualified immunity inquiry and award the officer immunity because the
constitutional right in question was not “clearly established.” But if
courts do this regularly, then there is a very real risk that constitutional rights will never get clearly established. Second, Iqbal is problematic because it makes it easier for courts to dismiss civil rights
lawsuits. I discuss each of these in turn.115
115. There are critiques of Saucier, and arguments against sequencing, that sound in
constitutional law. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rul-
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This problem has been identified for some time in the academic literature. As far back as 1991, Fallon and Meltzer explained that after the early qualified immunity cases, courts would “deny relief
without deciding whether a constitutional violation in fact occurred.”116 They criticized this process, arguing that it “restrict[s] the
opportunity for judges to address novel claims . . . [and] thus tend[s]
to freeze the development of constitutional law.”117 Just before Saucier, Greabe wrote the defense of qualified immunity, when “it encourages merits bypasses, is . . . a substantial impediment to the development of new constitutional law in civil rights damages actions.”118
Shortly after Saucier, Kamin wrote, “if the question of the entitlement to qualified immunity is addressed before the substance of a
plaintiff's claim, [then] the contours of the law will never become
well-defined, and the entitlement of defendants to qualified immunity will continue in perpetuity.”119
These risks—mitigated during the Siegert era and reduced to near
zero in the Wilson-Saucier era—are back to the fore now. And these
problems are not merely theoretical. As a recent article demonstrates, there is empirical support for the proposition that WilsonSaucier sequencing furthers the development of the constitutional
law.120 Hughes argues compellingly that courts have been more willings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 930 (2005). I do not focus on these criticisms here for two reasons. First, there are compelling responses to these criticisms. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued
Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53 (2009) (disposing of the argument
that merits-first adjudication violates the Article III ban on advisory opinions). Second, so
long as the Supreme Court gave its approval to merits-first decisions, the constitutional
problems were, at least as a practical matter, moot. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (“We are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final.”). In my view, so long as the constitutional
questions were bracketed (because the Supreme Court said so), the only relevant issue was
whether merits-first ordering was worthwhile. The Supreme Court’s stated justification for
this ordering, from Seigert to Wilson to Saucier, was the need for elaboration of the constitutional law. Therefore, I proceed from the premise that (1) the Court saw constitutional
elaboration as a worthwhile goal, and (2) this is the value most likely to be lost when mandatory ordering is abandoned.
116. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1735 (1991).
117. Id. at 1735, 1797-98 (1991). Fallon and Meltzer were discussing Harlow as juxtaposed against Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a case involving post-conviction habeas
corpus review. They point out that, per Teague, a habeas petition that relied on new law—
i.e., law that was not “clearly established”—is to be dismissed without any discussion of the
constitutional merits. At least for some time, the civil rights and habeas contexts diverged,
as lower courts were instructed, from Siegert through Pearson, to address the constitutional merits first, even in a claim that would fail under step two, on a claim that would get
summarily dismissed under Teague.
118. John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 411 (1999).
119. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1,
50 (2002).
120. Hughes, supra note 51, at 422-23.
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ing to elaborate on the nature of constitutional rights in the postSiegert, and especially the post-Saucier, eras much more so than they
were doing in the post-Harlow, pre-Siegert era.121 Before Siegert,
courts reached the constitutional merits in only about two-thirds of
all cases.122 After Saucier, that figure was up to almost ninety-nine
percent.123 It is true that the rate at which courts rejected claims of
constitutional violations almost doubled from the 1980s to the postSaucier era.124 However, the rate at which courts did recognize such
violations also grew.125 This is undoubtedly a net positive for civil
rights litigants. Moreover, as Hughes points out,126 even negative articulation can have value because it furthers predictability and may
even spur Congress to act.127 But I would go one step further. Suppose the right X has been clearly established and a litigant is now
pressing a claim based on X1, a related but novel theory. It would be
ideal for the plaintiff if the court finds a constitutional violation. But
even if the court finds no violation, the ruling is beneficial to civil
rights litigants. The next time a similar case comes up, lawyers are
on notice that a claim of X1 will fail. Therefore, they will shift their
energies to now arguing X2. Or, they will explain how this case differs
from the previous one. But in the absence of mandatory sequencing,
subsequent cases would keep relitigating X1, leading to a Groundhog
Day-esque repetition.
It is already clear is that courts are regularly dismissing cases on
the ground that the right in question is not clearly established and not
discussing the constitutional merits.128 And it is clear the contours of
these rights would be defined with clarity in a pre-Pearson world. The
effects of this avoidance may be felt beyond the realm of civil rights litigation. If the court decides to pass on a constitutional question regard121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 424. Another empirical study contends that the constitutional law has only
developed in a negative direction after Saucier, i.e., has almost always refused to recognize
new rights. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 670 (2009). However, Hughes provides a compelling response to this position in his article. Hughes, supra note 51, at 428-29 n.122.
124. Hughes, supra note 51, at 422-23.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 428 n.122.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Cole v. Buchanan County Sch. Bd., No. 08-1105, 2009 WL 1336720, at *2
(4th Cir. May 14, 2009) (skipping to step two and declining to decide whether a member of
the press has the right not to be excluded from school property that is otherwise open to
the public); Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether a candidate for office has a First Amendment right to receive campaign contributions);
Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether passing a counterfeit note, without more, provides probable cause for arrest);
Starling v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, No. 08-80008-CIV, 2009 WL 281051, at *8 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 2, 2009) (declining to decide if there is a protected liberty interest in an adulterous
sexual relationship).
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ing criminal law, criminal defendants and prosecutors are denied the
benefits of constitutional articulation. And if the court, in skipping the
merits inquiry, disposes of the case by way of an unpublished decision,
the case has no precedential effect whatsoever.
So this is the obvious way Pearson harms civil rights plaintiffs: by
permitting courts to skip step one, it makes it more likely that they
will elect not to address the merits of constitutional claims. This has
the potential to stagnate the constitutional law. And if the recent
empirical work is any indication, it will reverse the trend of constitutional elaboration that has been under way for two decades.129
There is also a straightforward way in which Iqbal hurts civil rights
plaintiffs. Simply put, Iqbal raises the bar on civil rights plaintiffs and,
indeed, all plaintiffs. Regardless of how the Court may have characterized its decision, the fact remains that lower courts nationwide are
applying a stricter standard post-Iqbal than they were before it.130
The academic commentary has recognized these and related problems with Iqbal. Kilaru notes in his article131 that Iqbal calls into
question the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford-El v. Britton132
(a point I describe below) as well as Pullman-Standard v. Swint.133
Klein argues that Iqbal may be unconstitutional as the “heightened”
pleading standard it imposes runs afoul of the Seventh Amendment’s
jury trial guarantee.134 I do not focus on these problems here because
I am interested in the more subtle—but no less harsh—ways that the
interaction between the two cases is problematic for civil rights plaintiffs. I turn to these issues next.

129. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 51.
130. See, e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Post-Twombly,
plaintiffs face a higher burden of pleading facts, and courts face greater uncertainty in evaluating complaints.”); Coles v. Eagle, No. 09-00167 DAE-BMK, 2009 WL 2700210, at *4 (D.
Haw. Aug. 27, 2009) (“A careful review of [the complaint] reveals that, under the stricter
pleading standard recently set forth by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . Coles
fails to state a claim against the [defendants.]”) (emphasis added); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL 2246194, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009) (“As
to [plaintiff’s] damage claims for past violations, a different problem arises, namely the
stricter pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . .”) (second emphasis added); In re Bishop, No. 08-11156-MWV, 2009 WL 2231197, at *2 n.4 (Bankr. D.N.H. July 24, 2009) (noting “the higher pleading requirements established in the Ashcroft decision”); In re Caremerica, 409 B.R.737, 754 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2009) (“[T]he court admits that claims for relief
are more difficult to plead sufficiently following Twombly and Iqbal.”).
131. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of
Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434254, at 104.
132. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
133. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
134. Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261 (2009).
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B. The Less Obvious
There are at least two (and probably three) other, more indirect,
ways in which these cases harm civil rights plaintiffs.
1. The Horns of a Dilemma
First, the Pearson-Iqbal interaction threatens to catch a civil
rights plaintiff on the horns of a dilemma. Put crudely, the problem is
this: a plaintiff who says enough to satisfy Iqbal will find that he has
said too much and loses because his purported right is not clearly established, per Pearson. If he says less to survive the qualified immunity analysis, he will find that he has not said enough to survive dismissal because of Iqbal.
Consider this hypothetical: an aggrieved civil rights plaintiff
(Pete)135 will file a complaint that alleges the violation of some constitutional right—say, the right to be free from excessive force. Suppose,
though, that the incident involved some relatively unusual circumstances: a stop-and-frisk, in a car, parked in the garage of the individual’s home. The plaintiff might argue that his constitutional rights
were violated, namely, his right to be free from excessive force during
a stop-and-frisk that occurs in or adjacent to one’s home.
Now, however, the Supreme Court has decided Pearson. The right
to be free from excessive force during a stop-and-frisk in one’s car adjacent to one’s house is a rather narrow definition of the right in
question. Suppose that Pete lives in a circuit that has not decided
whether such a right exists. Pete is concerned, having read Pearson,
that the district court will simply conclude that the right is not clearly established and he will be left high-and-dry.
But Pete is a bright fellow, as hypothetical individuals tend to be.
So Pete decides he will simply claim a violation of his right to be free
from excessive force at the hands of a police officer. This right is
clearly established, and he does not run into the Pearson problem.
Alas, it is not to be for our friend Pete. “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice[!]”136 By reframing his cause of action in more
general terms, he has avoided the Scylla of Pearson only to get
caught on the Charybdis of Iqbal: his more general pleading will be
seen as conclusory. And if it is not, a court exercising its “common
sense” (as Iqbal instructs) could well conclude that the claim was not
“plausible”—if Pete really had a claim, why would he frame it so

135. The plaintiff’s name in a hypothetical always begins with “P.” For the uninitiated,
that’s how these things work.
136. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
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broadly instead of focusing on the specific facts and cause of action
that he is pressing?
And so this is the dilemma: say too much, and you lose because of
Pearson; say too little, and you lose because of Iqbal.
The problem can be more vividly illustrated by the facts of a case
recently decided by the federal district court in Connecticut. In DiStiso v. Wolcott, Robin DiStiso sued various school officials on behalf of
Nicholas, her minor son.137 Robin alleged, inter alia, that the other
students at school harassed, taunted, and assaulted Nicholas because
of his race.138 She further alleged that she complained to Nicholas’s
first-grade teacher, Tammy Couture, and the principal, John Cook,
and they did nothing to respond to the complaints.139 Robin and her
husband testified to this effect at their depositions.140 For their part,
Couture and Cook stated in affidavits that they never observed such
conduct and never received such complaints from the parents.141
It is clear that these allegations do not make out a claim of intentional discrimination against Nicholas. It is not as if, for example,
Couture gave Nicholas a failing grade because of her racial animus
toward him. Instead, Robin proceeded on a theory of deliberate indifference. The Second Circuit had at least partially explained how such
suits should proceed some years earlier, writing that “deliberate indifference can be found when the defendant’s response to known discrimination ‘is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.’ ”142 Robin therefore had to demonstrate that there was evidence from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that (1) the
students were harassing Nicholas on the basis of his race; (2) Couture and Cook were aware of this harassment; and (3) their response,
or lack thereof, was “clearly unreasonable.”143
What this leaves out is any consideration of the effect of the deliberate indifference on Nicholas himself. The courts had, however,
spoken to the question in the context of deliberate indifference to
student-on-student sexual harassment. The Supreme Court held in
Davis v. Monroe County144 that, in the context of Title IX, a school
could be liable if it is deliberately indifferent to student-on-student
sexual harassment. But Davis also held that, in order to prevail, the
137. 539 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 (D. Conn. 2008), vacated and remanded, 352 F. App’x
478 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit remanded because the District Court’s treatment of
qualified immunity was “cursory,” although this does not really affect my analysis here.
138. Id. at 564.
139. Id. at 566.
140. Id. at 568.
141. See id. There were other claims in the complaint, but in my analysis here I only
focus on the deliberate indifference discrimination claim.
142. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1999).
143. DiStiso, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 567.
144. 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
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harassment must have been “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”145 Gant, the
Second Circuit case regarding student-on-student racial harassment,
had declined to decide whether such a racially-hostile educational
environment was necessary in a deliberate indifference race discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause.146
If this case had come about after Pearson-Iqbal, Robin and Nicholas would find themselves caught on precisely the dilemma I described above.147 If they pled a very specific constitutional right—the
right to be free from race discrimination, premised on a theory of deliberate indifference—they might find their claim dismissed by Pearson; a court could conclude that the right in question is not “clearly
established” because no relevant court had decided whether a hostile
educational environment was a required part of such a claim. If Robin and Nicholas pled their claim at a level of generality—say, simply
the right to be free from racial discrimination—they would almost
certainly lose because of Iqbal. Any allegations regarding intentional,
active discrimination by Cook or Couture would be conclusory because the real nub of the claim against them (on this count) was not
that they did discriminatory things to Nicholas; it was that they willfully ignored others’ discriminatory treatment. In such a context, any
allegation Cook or Couture actively engaged in discriminatory conduct would be seen as “conclusory,” as the allegations discarded by
the Supreme Court in Iqbal.
And so, in a Pearson-Iqbal world, Robin and Nicholas would be
stuck. They could plead the violation of a specific constitutional
right—indeed, the one that is most directly applicable to the fact pattern—and risk getting tossed by Pearson. Or they could plead the violation of a more general constitutional right and risk getting thrown
out by Iqbal.
There are several important implications here. The first, of course,
is the interaction between Pearson and Iqbal makes life very difficult
for civil rights litigants and their lawyers. The second is the interaction between the two cases makes a stand-alone problem even worse.
Recall that Pearson, by its own terms, would be undesirable because
it risks stagnation of constitutional law. This dissuades litigants from
pressing novel constitutional theories. However, when operating in
tandem, the cases make it difficult even to plead existing constitutional theories. The Second Circuit had already held school officials
145. Id. at 650.
146. See Gant, 195 F.3d at 140 n.5 (declining to answer the question and noting some of
the aspects of Davis may have turned on the fact it was a Title IX case).
147. The difference, of course, would be that the real-life plaintiffs’ names do not necessarily start with “P.”
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could be liable by virtue of their deliberate indifference.148 Robin and
Nicholas would get tripped up by Pearson-Iqbal even if they pled a
theory of race discrimination that had been recognized since 1999.
Of course, there is no guarantee this case would get tripped up by
the interaction effect. But rather than mitigate the problem, this possibility actually underscores it. Pearson gives courts the discretion to
decide which step of the qualified immunity analysis to address first,
and Iqbal tells courts to make “common sense” decisions. But this rather wide-ranging discretion makes it nearly impossible to predict
how a court will respond to a particular fact pattern.149
In its decision in Iqbal, the Second Circuit recognized a version of
the problem I describe.150 The court noted Rule 8 establishes a rather
liberal pleading standard. However, this standard, “when applied
mechanically without countervailing discovery safeguards, threatens
to create a dilemma between adhering to the Federal Rules and abiding by the principle that qualified immunity is an immunity from suit
as well as from liability.”151 The Supreme Court avoided this dilemma
by raising the pleading bar in Iqbal and permitting courts to more
easily dismiss claims on the basis of immunity in Pearson. But the
pendulum has swung too far; in trying to shield government officials
from liability, the Court has thrust civil rights litigants into an untenable, damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don’t position.
After making this rather sweeping point I will qualify it in two respects. First, it must be acknowledged that Iqbal and Pearson do not
necessarily interact in every single case. Iqbal’s standards apply to
the allegations a plaintiff must make regarding the actions that the
defendant(s) took toward him. Pearson applies to the showing a
plaintiff must make regarding the constitutional right that was violated. Although these will often overlap—as in the examples
above—they need not overlap in every case. For example, we could
modify the facts of Nicholas’s case slightly. Imagine that Nicholas’s
teachers regularly made him sit in the corner of the classroom,
picked on him, and otherwise singled him out for derogatory treatment on account of his race. The right to be free from intentional racial discrimination by the defendants (as opposed to deliberate indifference discrimination) has long been clearly established. Therefore,
the claim would proceed to trial.
Suppose, though, that Nicholas wants to also press a claim that the
discrimination he suffered was not just because Couture hated him but

148. Gant, 195 F.3d at 150.
149. I discuss the problem with the cases’ approach to lower court discussion in more
detail in Subsection III.B.2 infra.
150. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
151. Id. at 159.

2010]

PROCEDURAL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

929

also because Cook had directed a conspiracy to deprive black students
of an education. Nicholas would have to allege facts sufficient to establish that Couture discriminated against him (a straight discrimination
claim), but he would also have to allege facts regarding the conspiracy
involving Cook (a § 1985 civil rights conspiracy claim). In this scenario,
fairly simple allegations would get Nicholas past a motion to dismiss
as against Couture. The Iqbal problem would come up—just as it did
in Iqbal—in the context of attempting to plead sufficient allegations to
make out a conspiracy claim. But this problem would be one of pleading alone and would not implicate the constitutional right at issue, and
therefore would not implicate Pearson.
The real question (and one that is unknowable at this early stage)
is how many cases will involve the dilemma I identify and how many
will be relatively straightforward. What we can say is this: Iqbal will
be problematic in any case where the very detail a plaintiff has to
plead (per Iqbal) to make her claim takes her out of the clearly established realm. Pre-Pearson, she could at least plead enough “Iqbal detail,” so to speak, and be assured that she would get a ruling on the
constitutional right at issue (Saucier step 1). Now, she is not even assured that much and will likely get kicked out on a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, as Nicholas’s example demonstrates, this can be problematic even in non-cutting-edge cases. For example, in Saucier, the
issue was one of excessive force. But the Court was clear it was not
testing whether the general right to be free from excessive force during an arrest was clearly established; the right has to be defined at a
greater level of particularity. So the § 1983 plaintiff’s attorney has to
decide: “how specifically am I going to define this right?” Even in the
variation on Nicholas’s case I gave above, one could imagine that
Cook had promulgated a policy that might be read as being “aggressive” toward certain students (or some such), a policy that might
plausibly suggest a “discrimination conspiracy.” But if the right must
be defined at a greater level of particularity (per Anderson, etc.), then
we are back to the interaction problem: more specificity risks the
possibility the pleadings are no longer “Iqbal compliant” (though they
may have been when operating at a level of generality).
There is another issue. At the motion to dismiss stage, a court
must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the facts alleged by
the plaintiff, viewed most favorably to him, make out a constitutional
violation. However, as a group of law professors explained in their
amicus brief in Iqbal:
[W]hat is now described as the first step is, in fact, only a reflection
of the plaintiff’s standard obligation to show her entitlement to relief
under Rule 8(a)(2). As a matter of trans-substantive procedural law,
a failure to make such a showing in any case would trigger a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. No different
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rule applies to constitutional claims, for nothing in this Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence suggests that the first element should
be accorded any specialized treatment or scrutiny.152

In other words, if the facts viewed most favorably to the plaintiff
did not make out a constitutional violation, not only would the defendant be entitled to qualified immunity, the complaint (at least as to
that claim) would also be dismissed.
This demonstrates another interaction effect between Pearson and
Iqbal. Because Iqbal effectively raises pleading standards, thus requiring more for a plaintiff to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it correspondingly has the effect of raising the bar for plaintiffs
at the first step of qualified immunity. Again, Iqbal makes no mention of this fact.
In sum, there are two ways the interaction between Pearson and
Iqbal is bad for civil rights plaintiffs. First, a plaintiff faces a potentially untenable situation with regard to how narrowly to define the
constitutional right at issue. Pleading the claim narrowly might
render the claim so novel as not to be “clearly established,” and the
plaintiff would lose straight away because of Pearson and not even
get a ruling on the constitutional merits. But pleading the claim
broadly might require allegations at a level of generality and therefore get discarded because they are “conclusory” or otherwise not
“plausible.” Second, by raising the pleading standard, Iqbal has effectively raised the bar for “Saucier step one.”153 Neither the subsequent
case law nor the academic commentary—let alone Pearson and Iqbal
themselves—recognizes this problem.
2. Discretion That Only Cuts One Way
The second way in which Pearson and Iqbal are problematic relates to their treatment of the discretion a lower court has. The cases
simultaneously expand and contract the permissible bounds of a district court’s discretion—but only do so in a way that makes it easier
to dismiss civil rights lawsuits.
Pearson gives district courts the discretion to skip directly to step
two of the qualified immunity analysis. “The judges of the district
courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their
sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circums152. Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Practice as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 29-30, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015).
153. This will be most problematic for plaintiffs who have already prevailed on a motion
to dismiss (pre-Iqbal) but who now face a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity (post-Iqbal). Such a plaintiff would have made the requisite showing under the old standard but will now lose if those allegations are deemed insufficient under the new standard.
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tances in the particular case at hand.”154 To be sure, this does not
mean that courts will never use Saucier sequencing. The Supreme
Court has noted the sequence is “often beneficial,”155 and courts have
heeded this advice and continued to adhere to the sequence in certain
cases. For example, in Kelsey v. County of Schoharie,156 the Second
Circuit noted the sequential analysis “is said to be appropriate in”
certain types of cases, and “[t]his is such a case.”157 The court explained that:
[D]evelopment of constitutional precedent is especially important
here, where (1) this Court has not spoken on the issue of the constitutionality of [the procedure sub judice] although the issue has
been presented in district courts in this circuit . . . ; and (2) the
constitutionality of [the procedure] may never be developed if this
Court were to dispose of all challenges relating to the procedures
simply because the procedure is not “clearly established.”158

In so holding, the Second Circuit recognized (and avoided) the
problem I identified above, namely, that courts’ regularly moving to
“step two” would restrict the development of constitutional law.159
However, far more courts—dozens, in just a few months after Pearson—have skipped directly to the second step of the analysis.160
As Hughes’s empirical study makes clear, when sequencing is
mandatory—or at least strongly suggested—courts will engage in it
more often. My early survey of post-Pearson cases indicates courts
are indeed engaging in sequencing less frequently.
Although this point is related to the one made earlier (that Pearson harms civil rights plaintiffs because it limits the development of
constitutional law), it is distinct. My point in this section is not just
that it is easier to dismiss civil rights claims against personal154. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
155. Id.
156. 567 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2009).
157. Id. at 61.
158. Id. at 61-62 (citations omitted).
159. See supra Part 0.
160. See, e.g., Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, 577 F.3d 1196, 1199, (10th Cir.
2009) (“The officers contend that even assuming a constitutional violation . . . it was not
clearly established . . . . We agree.”); Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 544 (6th Cir.
2009) (resolving the constitutional merits “is unnecessary because . . . [the] purported constitutional right is not clearly established”); Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir.
2009) (“[W]e conclude that, regardless of whether a right to receive campaign contributions
exists, it was not clearly established . . . and Blumenthal is therefore entitled to qualified
immunity.”); Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“Even if the officers’ actions violated Lewis’s Fourth Amendment rights, the appellant did
not demonstrate that the officers’ conduct was an intrusion on a clearly established right.”);
Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2009)(“Police officers
are not constitutional lawyers, and they should not have to fear personal damages liability
when they enforce the plain terms of an ordinance that has not been challenged in court,
let alone overturned, unless its unconstitutionality is patent.”).
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capacity defendants. It is that the Supreme Court has given lower
courts the discretion to do so, even though it has given them no corresponding discretion to preserve such constitutional claims.
Consider, for example, this illustration: a prisoner, who holds certain religious beliefs, sues prison officials for failing to provide him a
diet that comports with his religious beliefs (say, vegan). Suppose a
prisoner-plaintiff makes all of the necessary showings at the summary judgment stage regarding the constitutional violation. However, the district court concludes that, at the time of the alleged violation, the right was not clearly established. Per Pearson, the court will
be free to grant the defendant(s) immunity.
Now suppose the prisoner has demonstrated at the summary
judgment stage that prison officials knew he was a vegan, denied him
vegan meals, and knew he adhered to a particular religion. Suppose
further that this alleged violation took place at such a time that the
right was clearly established within the relevant jurisdiction. However, it was not clear whether there was evidence from which a jury
could conclude that the prisoner’s veganism derived from a sincerely
held religious belief, the threshold belief in any such case.161 Under
the prevailing law, the court would be within its rights to dismiss the
claim because the plaintiff had not put forth evidence from which a
fact-finder could conclude his rights had been violated. But nothing
in Pearson—or any other case—explicitly directs courts to exercise
their discretion to require further elaboration of threshold questions.
And although district courts are routinely said to possess various inherent powers,162 a court that went out of its way to exercise discretion on behalf of a civil rights plaintiff in this context would probably
be held to have exceeded its discretion. This is because, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed, qualified immunity is not
just an immunity from having to pay damages, but immunity from
having to participate in litigation at all.163 A defendant who makes a
poor showing on Saucier step one can still appeal to the district
court’s discretion to decide step two first. But a plaintiff who makes a
poor showing on either step very likely cannot appeal to such discretion because the court’s discretion is limited, if it exists at all.164

161. See, e.g., DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).
162. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
(“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies.”); United States v. $40,955.00 in U.S. Currency, 554 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir.
2009) (noting a district court’s “inherent power to control litigation”).
163. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).
164. As described earlier, see supra Part 0, the Court’s jurisprudence over the last
three decades has been in the direction of limiting the scope of civil rights litigation, both
substantively (by establishing the qualified immunity doctrine, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
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One of the justifications for this one-way discretion is that it will be
more efficient. Yet this justification does not hold water on closer inspection. This is because an attorney—wanting to cover all bases—
would presumably argue (1) there was no constitutional violation, and
(2) even if there was, the purported right was not clearly established.
This is precisely what the defendant-appellants did in Green v.
Post, to take an example that came about shortly after Pearson.165
The Tenth Circuit concluded the officer’s conduct did not violate a
constitutional right.166 However, the court continued, “[a]lternatively,
even were we to conclude that the Greens can establish a constitutional violation . . . we would conclude that Deputy Post is entitled to
qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at
the time of the incident.”167 This discussion is plainly unnecessary to
the result in the case: having concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred, the court could end the qualified immunity inquiry
under any standard, including Saucier.168 Pearson permits, and as a
practical matter, probably requires, litigants to argue in the alternative. And as Green demonstrates, this presents the risk of courts
speaking to unnecessary legal questions—one of the very charges leveled at Saucier.
Iqbal also expands and contracts district courts’ discretion in a
way that is problematic for civil rights litigants. The Second Circuit,
in its decision, was acutely aware of the tension between Rule 8’s liberal pleading rules and the policy underlying qualified immunity,
viz., the need to protect government officials not only from liability
but also from litigation itself. Therefore, though the court concluded
that Iqbal’s complaint had stated a viable claim, it cautioned the district court to keep a close eye on the litigation. The discussion focused
principally on the discretion that district courts possess. For example, “mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose of the qualified
immunity defense by dismissing non-meritorious claims against public officials at an early stage of litigation,” a district court could “consider exercising its discretion to permit some limited and tightly con457 U.S. 800 (1982)) and procedurally (by authorizing interlocutory appeals, see Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985)).
165. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2009) (No.
08-1122). Post presumably raised the alternative arguments because Saucier still controlled at the time. But the problem persists to this day. See, e.g., Appellee’s Opening Brief,
Olseth v. Larson, No. 10-4015, 2010 WL 2397296, at *23 (June 4, 2010) (“Even if this Court
[concludes that there was a constitutional violation], Larson is still entitled to qualified
immunity because Olseth cannot demonstrate that Larson’s decision to shoot her was contrary to clearly established law at the time of the violation.”).
166. See Green, 574 F.3d at 1304.
167. Id.
168. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would
have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”).
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trolled reciprocal discovery so that a defendant may probe for amplification of a plaintiff's claims and a plaintiff may probe such matters
as a defendant’s knowledge of relevant facts and personal involvement in challenged conduct.”169
The court was particularly concerned about the prospect of “current or former senior officials of the Government, against whom
broad-ranging allegations of knowledge and personal involvement are
easily made.”170 Therefore, it suggested,
a district court [could] structure such limited discovery by examining written responses to interrogatories and requests to admit before authorizing depositions, and by deferring discovery directed to
high-level officials until discovery of front-line officials has been
completed and has demonstrated the need for discovery higher up
the ranks. If discovery directed to current or former senior officials
becomes warranted, a district court might also consider making all
such discovery subject to prior court approval.171

The Second Circuit explained that the liberal standard of Rule 8,
“when applied mechanically without countervailing discovery safeguards, threatens to create a dilemma between adhering to the Federal Rules and abiding by the principle that qualified immunity is an
immunity from suit as well as from liability.”172 Therefore, it explained
that in cases such as Iqbal, a lower court “not only may, but ‘must exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense.’ ”173 The district court was also required to provide an opportunity for defendants to move for summary judgment as
soon as it was apparent “that certain of the Defendants were not sufficiently involved in the alleged violations to support a finding of personal liability, or that no constitutional violation took place.”174
The Second Circuit’s focus on district courts’ discretion was not
isolated or unusual. For years, the Supreme Court had instructed
courts to exercise their discretion in precisely the way the Second
Circuit suggested, managing the course of litigation in such a way
that gave plaintiffs the opportunity to determine facts not within
their power to ascertain at the complaint stage while simultaneously
preserving the essence of the immunity defense for defendants.
More than a decade ago, in Crawford-El v. Britton,175 the Supreme
Court explained this process. The court has the power to order a reply
169. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 159.
173. Id. (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998) (emphasis in Iqbal)).
174. Id. at 159 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821 (1982) (Brennan,
J. concurring)).
175. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
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to the defendant’s answer per Rule 7 or require a more definite statement of the plaintiff’s claims per Rule 12. “Thus, the [district] court
may insist that the plaintiff put forward specific, nonconclusory factual
allegations that establish improper motive causing cognizable injury in
order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary
judgment.”176 This passage is important. In Iqbal, the Court instructed
that conclusory allegations must be disregarded altogether. Yet in
Crawford-El, the Court explained that judges had the discretion to order fuller explication of claims pertaining to a defendant’s state of
mind. Iqbal makes no mention of Crawford-El (in either the majority
or dissent), and therefore litigants and commentators must assume it
is still good law.177 Yet it is difficult, if not impossible, to square the
two. Crawford-El devotes an entire section to “the existing procedures
available to federal trial judges in handling claims that involve examination of an official’s state of mind.”178 Iqbal flatly states, without any
acknowledgement of Crawford-El, “We have held . . . that the question
presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings
does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery process.”179 The
only citation for this proposition is Twombly, though Twombly did not
implicate “claims that involve examination of an official’s state of
mind,”180 and thus it is unclear why Twombly has more relevance to
the case than Crawford-El.
Courts have regularly permitted narrow or otherwise carefully
managed discovery as a method to test the viability of a plaintiff’s
claims while shielding a defendant from the burdens of full-blown
discovery. For example, district courts routinely permit or deny limited discovery to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists in
a given district, based on the facts of the particular cases.181 Although
the precise standard regarding jurisdictional discovery varies by cir176. Id. at 598 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997) (“ ‘[I]f a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’ ”) (emphasis added)
(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
178. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597.
179. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
180. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597.
181. See, e.g., Mother Doe I v. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1144 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(“It is well-accepted that a qualified right to jurisdictional discovery exists.”); Pettengill v.
Curtis, 584 F. Supp. 2d 348, 361 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery because he failed to provide “specific allegations that might give rise to
personal jurisdiction,” but noting that if discovery “develops evidence demonstrating personal jurisdiction” over the dismissed defendants, plaintiff “may move to have them added
as parties again”); 7240 Shawnee Mission Holding, LLC v. Memon, No. 08-2207-JWL, 2008
WL 4001159, *4 (D. Kan., Aug. 26, 2008) (“The court finds that based on these exhibits and
the showing of controverted facts related to jurisdiction, Plaintiffs should be allowed limited discovery regarding personal jurisdiction.”).
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cuit,182 these and similar decisions are described as being within the
discretion of the district court.183 The Supreme Court has even recently held that a district court has the discretion to decide a defendant’s
motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, even before
deciding whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.184 The viability of
such procedures is in some doubt after Iqbal, since a borderline complaint is now to be dismissed outright.185
Consider, in this same vein, Rule 9(b)’s requirement that fraud
must be pled with particularity. The Supreme Court explained in Iqbal that “particularity” is a relative term; it simply indicates that
more is required for a fraud claim, not that state of mind and the like
(which may be alleged “generally”) can pass muster with less than
the Rule 8 minimum.186 Yet the circuits were in agreement, preIqbal, that Rule 9(b)’s requirements were relaxed when the facts material to a fraud claim were in the defendant’s exclusive possession
and could be obtained only through discovery.187 These cases, too, are
apparently still good law; at least one district court has recently applied this standard, even after Iqbal.188 But again, the case law is
hard to square. Iqbal did not permit a case to go forward when there
were general allegations against government officials. It is hard to
imagine that the common practice of permitting cases that were subject to a heightened standard to go forward can be maintained after
182. GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (permitting jurisdictional discovery even when plaintiff’s complaint did not make out
a prima facie case); Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 148 F.3d 181, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that the district court acted within its discretion to deny jurisdictional discovery
when plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie showing of jurisdiction); Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d
934, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
183. See, e.g., Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo), Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“The district court did not abuse this broad discretion when it limited discovery
related to whether there was personal jurisdiction . . . .”); Sunview Condo. Ass’n v. Flexel
Int’l, Ltd., 116 F.3d 962, 964 (1st Cir. 1997) (permitting jurisdictional discovery subject to
the discretion of the district court).
184. Sinochem Int’l Co., Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
185. This may overstate the issue somewhat, but only somewhat. Even pre-Iqbal,
courts had long held that bare assertions of contact with the forum were insufficient to
trigger jurisdictional discovery. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 806-07 (4th
Cir. 1983). However, Iqbal still changes this landscape because a marginal complaint is
never to proceed to discovery, limited, carefully managed, or otherwise. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
186. Iqbal,129 S. Ct. at 1954.
187. See, e.g., Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1998); In re
Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997); Kowal v.
MCI Comm. Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1279 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that pleading on information and belief is permitted when the evidence at issue is within the defendant’s control); Devaney v. Chester, 813 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting “the degree of particularity required [by Rule 9(b)] should be determined in light of such circumstances as
whether the plaintiff has had an opportunity to take discovery of those who may possess
knowledge of the pertinent facts.”).
188. Morrison v. YTB Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774-75 (S.D. Ill. 2009).

2010]

PROCEDURAL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

937

Iqbal. But if that line of cases must be considered abrogated, then it
is clear Iqbal’s analysis, ostensibly in the context of Rule 8, has disrupted the standards applicable to Rule 9(b) cases as well.
So Iqbal effectively ratchets back district courts’ discretion, instructing them to dismiss a complaint outright when a complaint’s
well-pleaded factual allegations are deemed implausible. But it also
expands district courts’ discretion in another, important direction: it
instructs courts to make this decision based on their “judicial experience and common sense.”189 The problem, of course, is that this kind
of a determination is so open-ended as to be almost unreviewable.190
And of course there is the question of how a case should proceed
when the appellate court’s “common sense” deviates from that of the
district court (or when there is a split within an appellate panel).
Common sense should be, well, common—shared by diverse individuals. Courts will now have the task of formulating a workable standard for “common sense” (The court’s? Which court? The litigants? A
reasonable third-party observer’s?), and then determining the proper
standard of review for such a determination.191
C. So What? The Case Against Procedural Activism
On one level, this might seem like much ado about nothing. District courts are vested with wide discretion in many areas of law, including some of the most important decisions that are made in criminal sentencing.192 And different doctrinal areas of law intersect—and
interact—all the time. To cite one relevant example, Rule 9(b)’s requirement of particularized allegations of fraud is at least arguably
in tension with the “broad and liberal”193 interpretation that is to apply to the discovery rules. What’s the big deal here?
The big deal, at least in my view, is the interactions between
Pearson and Iqbal all cut in the same direction. For example, in the
context of fraud claims, Rule 9’s particularity requirement cuts
189. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
190. See Joan Steinman, Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not FullFledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 411, 441 (2005) (noting appellate courts “rarely” conclude
that a district court’s course of action was in excess of its allowable discretion).
191. As of this writing, no Circuit Court of Appeals has formulated a standard of review for a district court’s “common sense” determination. So as not to render a “common
sense” finding unreviewable, I suggest the analysis must have two elements: first, it must
not be framed in conclusory terms. Second, the nonconclusory facts that support the determination must lead to a plausible (not merely possible) conclusion that the plaintiff’s
claims do not meet the “common sense” standard. This formulation, one might notice, has
much in common with the Twombly-Iqbal pleading regime. I offer it only slightly tonguein-cheek; I do submit that such a standard would offer a reviewing court a better record to
review than a statement by the trial court that was, well . . . conclusory.
192. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85 (2007).
193. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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against plaintiffs (who must plead more to get past a motion to dismiss) while the liberal discovery rules cut against defendants (who
must subject themselves to greater scrutiny from plaintiffs and their
attorneys). Motions to dismiss under Rule 12 or for summary judgment under Rule 56 benefit defendants (who can terminate litigation
before trial), but the facts at each stage are, at least in theory, viewed
most favorably to the plaintiff (who may ultimately prove disputed
facts if the case does go to trial). Indeed, even the most important issue of a civil trial—liability—reflects this balance: a finding of liability cuts against the defendant (who must pay up), but getting to that
point is harder for the plaintiff (who bears the burden of proof).
This kind of one-hand, other-hand balancing is conspicuously absent from Pearson-Iqbal. As I describe above, Pearson (in some cases)
requires a plaintiff to say less, while Iqbal requires a plaintiff to say
more. Neither of these cases so much as recognizes this dilemma, let
alone provides a way out. And a way out is not impossible to conceive:
for example, a plaintiff might be permitted to plead “Pearson generality” at the motion to dismiss stage but be required to adduce some
evidence of “Iqbal detail” at the summary judgment stage. This
would not even be much of a departure from pre-Iqbal case law: a
plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage was always entitled to rely on
his pleadings and allegations, while he was generally required to
show more at the summary judgment stage. Pearson-Iqbal, however,
forecloses this kind of sliding scale.
So too with the discretion that all cuts one way. Pearson’s rule that
sequencing is now voluntary increases a court’s discretion to dismiss
civil rights claims; Iqbal’s rule that discovery management is an inadequate tool decreases a court’s ability to preserve civil rights claims;
Iqbal’s directive to rely on common sense increases a court’s ability to
dismiss such claims. Once again, it is possible to devise a rule that
balances the interests of civil rights plaintiffs and defendants. For example, the Supreme Court could have (and I submit should have) announced the following rule, consistent with Twombly and pre-Twombly
authority: (1) civil rights claims require no heightened pleading standard; (2) if the allegations regarding a particular defendant’s actions
are “conclusory,” a court is to determine whether the claims against
him are consistent with liability and, if so, whether the facts necessary
to support such a claim are likely to be in the defendant’s possession. If
so, the court could order limited discovery or use other procedural
tools—as described in Crawford-El—to permit the plaintiff an opportunity to determine if he can make out a claim against the defendant.
If he did, the case would proceed in the normal course; if not, the case
would be dismissed. Again, such a formulation preserves the defendant’s interest in avoiding discovery intended only to harass, while
permitting the district court to operate with a scalpel rather than a
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mallet (and a rather one-dimensional mallet at that, since a court’s only option in such a context is dismissal).194
That is my answer to the “so what?” question. The point is not
that there are new rules (the merits of which we can debate) or even
that various rules interact. It is that these rules interact in a way
that harms civil rights plaintiffs and that there has been inadequate
recognition of this fact. As a result, the Supreme Court has sharply
constricted the universe of potentially successful civil rights claims.
And this is my argument against “procedural judicial activism.”
As Professor Miller points out, value judgments underlie every aspect
of civil procedure.195 By cloaking important value judgments in the
seemingly-neutral terms of procedure, the Supreme Court has dramatically altered the landscape for civil rights plaintiffs but managed
to do so largely under the radar. Yet these decisions are no less “activist” because they involve procedural rules rather than substantive
rights. So I use the term “procedural judicial activism” to refer to a
course of action taken by a court that significantly expands, abridges,
alters, or modifies substantive rights by way of the operation of procedural rules. A court enlarging or restricting the statute of limitations, for example, would be an example of procedural judicial activism. Similarly, a court altering rules regarding standing, justiciability, or similar topics qualifies as activist under this definition because
modifications to these rules have a trans-substantive effect. Although
a case could be made that the very creation of such rules was activist,
I use a narrower conception of the phrase, in which a decision is categorized as activist if it significantly departs from prior precedent
(even if the prior precedent might be categorized as activist). Thus,
Harlow itself might be characterized as activist for creating the modern qualified immunity doctrine. However, I bracket that question,
and label a decision activist if it departs from the post-Harlow understanding of the law of qualified immunity.
There are others who have written about this kind of judicial activism, or something like it,196 and an exhaustive analysis of the case
194. It is a relevant, but not wholly satisfactory, response to say that dismissal might
be without prejudice. Cf. Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574 F.3d 820 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding to the
district court to determine, in the first instance, whether plaintiffs should be given leave to
amend their complaint). First, it is likely that only cases “on the bubble,” i.e., pending at
the time Iqbal was decided, will get this benefit; future cases will likely be dismissed outright for failure to state a claim. Second, leave to replead, while softening the blow, does
not change the fact that the process is time-consuming and expensive, particularly in civil
rights cases that may be litigated pro bono with the hope of attorneys’ fees on the other
end. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (permitting attorneys’ fees for a prevailing plaintiff in a civil
rights action).
195. Miller, supra note 1.
196. Soree, for example, writes, “Procedural activism . . . may be suspected when a
court chooses to reach the merits of an issue despite justiciability rules that would (or
should) otherwise restrain the court from so doing, or when a court decides more than is
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law and academic literature is beyond the scope of this Article. However, I bring up the issue to highlight an important feature of both
Pearson and Iqbal: these decisions were not compelled, either by
precedent or by the questions presented in the cases themselves.
Consider, for example, that overruling Saucier was not even on
the radar when Pearson petitioned the Court for certiorari. It was the
Court, sua sponte, that raised the issue. In its order granting certiorari, the Court wrote,
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit granted. In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue
the following question: “Whether the Court's decision in Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) should
be overruled?”197

In so doing, the Court reached out to decide an issue that was neither
raised by the parties nor the court below. Such a course of action is
“activist” by virtually any definition.198
A similar problem afflicts Iqbal. As the dissent points out, the parties assumed that actual knowledge of unconstitutional conduct by
subordinate officers would subject petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller
to liability. The question was not whether they could be liable; it was
whether, assuming they could be liable, the allegations in the complaint were sufficient.199 Thus, the Court’s majority put Iqbal in a rather unfortunate position: he did not brief or argue the issue of liability, relying on petitioners’ concession, and this issue turned out to be
necessary to dispose of the case before it.” Nadia B. Soree, The Demise Of Fourth Amendment Standing: From Standing Room To Center Orchestra, 8 NEV. L.J. 570, 572 (2008). Susan Hauser uses the term “passive judicial activism,” to refer “to a court’s uncompelled use
of procedural doctrines to preclude future litigation or legislative action.” Susan E. Hauser,
Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the Duty to Decide, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1501, 1507 n.31 (2008); see also id. at 1551 (“The uncompelled use of procedural doctrines
to preclude future litigation . . . does not square with Bickel’s passive virtues or Sunstein’s
decisional minimalism; instead, it is a form of disguised judicial activism.”). This is similar
to the concept described recently in Laurin’s article, “remedial rationing.” Laurin explains
that criminal procedural rights can be vindicated either in a criminal case or in a civil case
(in a damages action under § 1983). But when civil and criminal law both offer means to
vindicate a particular right, the Court “is likely to channel enforcement into one regime or
the other,” not permit both to flourish. Jennifer E. Laurin, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City Of Houston, and Remedial Rationing, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
82, 85 (2009). What Laurin calls remedial rationing would also qualify as procedural activism in my framework because it involves imposing judge-made rules to curtail the remedies available for the vindication of one’s constitutional rights.
197. Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702, 1702-03 (2008) (order granting certiorari).
198. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1152 (2002) (“When we call the Court ‘activist’ because it ‘reaches out’
to decide an issue not strictly before it . . . we are complaining about judicial maximalism.
This form of activism shares with the other types . . . a refusal to defer to other actors in
the system.”).
199. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955-57 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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dispositive.200 The majority thus decided an issue of liability “that . . .
has no bearing on its resolution of the case.”201
After deciding the (unnecessary) question of Bivens liability, the
court turned to the sufficiency of the pleadings. But as Justice Souter
pointed out in his dissent, it was not clear what separated the “conclusory” allegations from the ones that were “nonconclusory.”202 And
where there is no “principled basis” for treating different allegations
differently,203 an observer is left to wonder if the majority’s conclusion
in Iqbal stemmed from results-driven reasoning simply based on a
policy belief that a government official’s right to be free from a vexatious lawsuit trumps an aggrieved civil rights plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief.
In fact one does not have to look far to see if that was the case. In
response to the argument that discovery could be managed to shield
government officials from expense, the Court writes:
Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust
of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including “avoidance of disruptive discovery.”
There are serious and legitimate reasons for this. If a Government
official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formulation
of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require
the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed.
Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with
the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure
of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to
the proper execution of the work of the Government. The costs of
diversion are only magnified when Government officials are
charged with responding to, as Judge Cabranes aptly put it, “a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the
history of the American Republic.”204

The policy motivation is clear: civil rights litigation “exacts heavy
costs” and “it is counterproductive” to require government officials to
litigate claims that may turn out to be meritless. Of course, one
might draw just the opposite conclusion: that unconstitutional conduct by government officials extracts heavy costs and it is counterproductive to shield such individuals from civil rights claims that
may turn out to be meritorious. The issue is not one of law. It is a pol-

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See id. at 1958.
Id.
Id. at 1961.
Id.
Id. at 1953 (citations omitted).

942

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:901

icy preference and nothing more. Yet, rather than defer to the judgment of the elected branches, or follow the procedure for amendment
of the Federal Rules as described in the Rules Enabling Act,205 the
Court took it upon itself to make these judgments on its own.
My point is not really that the Court got the policy judgment
wrong (although, if it was not clear, I do believe that it got it wrong).
My point, like the one made by Clermont and Yeazell, is that there
were policy judgments to be made, and that they should not have
been made by the Court.206 In other words, if the Rules Enabling Act
process had resulted in a higher pleading standard, or a curtailment
of district courts’ ability to manage litigation, or any similar change,
such a modification would be presumptively legitimate in a way that
the Court’s recent action is not.
In the criminal context, where all of the procedural chips fall in
the same direction—presumption of innocence, automatic access to
material exculpatory evidence, exclusionary rule, Miranda rights,
rule of lenity, and so on—they do so because we as a society have
made an explicit choice that defendants are presumed innocent and
that they are entitled to all of the “breaks” in this regard. We have
made no such decision, implicitly or explicitly, regarding civil rights
plaintiffs. The only congressional authority on the subject is § 1983,
which speaks of liability in almost unqualified terms. Section 1983’s
criminal analogue, 18 U.S.C. § 242, is even broader, prescribing a
criminal punishment for those who violate another’s rights under the
color of any law (i.e., state or federal law, as opposed to § 1983, which
only covers those acting under color of state law). Section 1983 was
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and, though the civil rights laws
have been amended in the century-plus since, it exists today unaltered from the original. In short, to the extent that there is a political
consensus in any direction, it is in favor of avenues to vindicate civil
rights. The Pearson-Iqbal interaction reverses (or at least sharply
curtails) this consensus, but does it sub silentio. Such a course of action should be problematic both for liberals who favor expanded
access to civil rights remedies and for conservatives who oppose
courts deciding cases more broadly than they should.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much has been written about Pearson and Iqbal in the past year.
Some of that commentary has even noted that the cases could be
harmful to civil rights plaintiffs.

205. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77.
206. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 20.

2010]

PROCEDURAL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

943

However, no article (online or in print) explores the interaction between these two cases. When viewed in this light, it is clear that the
cases bode poorly for those pressing civil rights claims. First, a plaintiff risks getting caught between a rock (Iqbal) and a hard place
(Pearson). If he pleads his claim in great detail, a court deciding qualified immunity will simply conclude his right is not clearly established and not even give him a ruling on the constitutional merits. If
he pleads generally to avoid this problem, he will get dismissed per
Iqbal, as his broad allegations could be seen as conclusory or otherwise not plausible because of the lack of detail.207 Moreover, the cases
do not recognize, at least explicitly, that at the motion to dismiss
stage the first step of the qualified immunity analysis is the same as
the analysis under Rule 12(b)(6). By changing the standard for motions to dismiss, the Court has also implicitly changed the standard
for “Saucier step one.”
The cases also interact with regard to lower courts’ discretion, but
only in a way that hurts civil rights claimants. Pearson gives courts
the discretion to decide which step of the immunity analysis to take
up first, but this discretion only makes it easier to dismiss claims on
the basis of immunity. Iqbal expands courts’ discretion by instructing
them to rely on common sense—a standard that, unless Courts of
Appeals cabin it, could turn out to be effectively unreviewable. At the
same time, Iqbal restricts courts’ discretion to carefully manage litigation, thus forcing them to dismiss claims outright when in the past
some targeted or limited discovery might have preserved the claims.
In other contexts, the interaction between rules either “cancels
out” (because, for example, Rule 9’s particularity requirement is offset by liberal discovery rules) or the procedural rules favor one side
because of an explicit policy choice (as in the case of criminal defendant). Neither is the case here. Instead, the Supreme Court has set
up a regime where these cases, individually and jointly, work to the
detriment of civil rights plaintiffs and, ultimately, all of us. It has
done so by endorsing certain policy preferences and rejecting others,
thus making political choices that should have been resolved through
other mechanisms. The mere fact that the rules are procedural is of
no moment; the decisions are just as far-reaching, and curtail civil
rights litigation just as much, as if they had come up in an area of
“substantive” law.
Though they may be hidden, “there are value judgments that lie
beneath the surface of each and every aspect of civil procedure. . . . [I]t

207. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (“Rule 8 does not empower [a
plaintiff] to . . . plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label “general allegation,” and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”).

944

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:901

simply takes you a long time to understand that.”208 We can only hope
that countless meritorious civil rights claims do not fall by the wayside
before academics, litigants, and judges come to this realization.

208. Miller, supra note 1.

